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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this
appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Appellee's Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment and denying Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration
where the only reasoning provided for setting aside the default was the
Court's sua sponte assertion that Appellee was not properly served with the
Notice to Appear of Appoint, but where Appellee was served with a Notice to
Appear or Appoint pursuant to Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure?
1.

Standard of Review: A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set
aside a default judgment. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75,H 9, 11 P.3d 277. Though
broad, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited. Id. As a threshold matter, a
court's ruling must be "based on adequate findings of fact" and "on the law." Id.
(citing May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). A
decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, for instance, constitutes an abuse
of discretion. Id.
Moreover, the nature of a default judgment and the equitable nature of
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide further limits. Id. at ^J10. For
example, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that a trial court's "discretion should
be exercised in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in
a doubtful case to the end that the party may have a hearing." Id. (citing Helgesen
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Court has further stated that "if default is issued when a party genuinely is
mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred,
the equity side of the con n t
11

rinciples,
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the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "'it is

quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default
judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's
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Helgesen, 636P.2dat 1081).
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"T\ pg. i 5J. [R. 275 (Ruling dated March 31, 2006 denying Motion for
Reconsideration, attached hereto as Addendum "3"].
SI A I EMEN1 OF ' 1 HE CASE
1- Nature of the Case 1 lie underlying facts of this case involve Appellant Kenneth
Davis' ("Davis") claims to real proper!} located in American Fork, I Jtah County.
Appellee Dennis Goldsworthy ("GoldsworuI\ > i.s she present title owner ( ,;..,

hereinafter, all citations to the trial transcript shall be designated [R.
page number and line number separated by a colon.
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property, having received title to the property through Davis' ex-wife, Edna Davis,
who is now deceased. In his complaint, Davis asserts a right to the property
through an agreement with his ex-wife and that the transfers to Goldsworthy were
in contravention to the agreement and were the result of undue influence and/or
fraud. [R. 012].
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Davis filed the present action on
December 23, 2003. [R: 006]. In June 2005, Goldsworthy failed to appear at a
regularly and properly scheduled deposition, and as a result Davis filed a Motion
to Compel Goldsworthy's attendance. [R: 066, 089]. Just prior to the hearing
scheduled on the Motion, Goldsworthy's counsel requested to withdraw from the
case. [R. 108-124].
Pursuant to Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Davis' counsel
mailed a Notice to Appear or Appoint to Goldsworthy via first class mail on
September 7, 2005. This Notice was sent to Goldsworthy's last known addresses.
[R. 130]. As a result of Goldsworthy's failure to appear on October 14, 2005 at the
rescheduled hearing on Davis' Motion to Compel and his failure to attend the
properly noticed deposition, the trial court struck Goldsworthy's pleadings and
entered default against him. [R. 134]. An order striking Goldsworthy's pleadings
was entered by the trial court on November 7, 2005. [R.134].
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Based on Davis' Request for a Hearing on Damages and Equitable Relief
the Court set a hearing for February 3, 2006. [R. 136]. Notice of this hearing was
sent out by the Court on December 22, 2005. [R. 139]. On January 27, 2006,
Gregory Hansen filed an appearance of counsel on Goldsworthy's behalf and filed
a Motion to Continue the Damages Hearing. [R. 148, 150]. On February 2, 2006,
Goldsworthy filed a Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default. [R. 156].
At the hearing on February 3, 2006, the trial court granted a continuance of
the hearing on damages until the Motion to Set Aside Default could be heard on
February 27, 2006. [R. 186]. At the hearing on the motion to set aside on February
27, 2006, the trial court granted the Motion to Set Aside Default based an issue not
raised or briefed by Goldsworthy but raised by the Court sua sponte. [R. 222]. On
March 3, 2006, responding to the Court's sua sponte reasoning for granting the
Motion to Set Aside Default, Davis filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court's decision setting forth controlling case law setting forth that improper
service of a notice to appear appoint is not grounds for setting aside default. [R.
232 - 237]. The Motion was denied on March 31, 2006. [R. 275]. Goldsworthy
later filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by the Court on August 7,
2006, and an order entered on September 8, 2006 [R. 364, 370]. A Notice of
Appeal was filed on October 5, 2006 [R. 373].
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts of this case concern the procedural history culminating in the
trial court's decision to set aside the default judgment entered against Goldsworthy. In
particular, on December 23, 2003, Davis filed a complaint and amended complaint
against Goldsworthy wherein Davis claimed ownership of real property located in
American Fork, Utah County. [R. 012:2]. Goldsworthy is the present owner of the
property, and received title to the property through Davis' ex-wife, Edna Davis, who is
now deceased. [R. 012:2-3]. In his complaint, Davis alleged claim to the property through
an agreement with his ex-wife and that the transfers to Goldsworthy were in
contravention to the agreement, and were the result of undue influence and/or fraud. [R.
012: 4-6].
On May 5, 2005, Davis noticed up Goldsworthy's deposition, to be held on
Monday, June 13, 2005. [R. 066:1]. Goldsworthy's counsel arranged to appear at the
deposition via telephone. However, at the appointed time of the deposition, Goldsworthy
failed to appear. [R. 166: 2]. On the record, Goldsworthy's counsel confirmed that he had
made several attempts to locate Goldsworthy but had been unable to do so. [R. 166: 3].
Accordingly, Davis filed a Motion to Compel Goldsworthy's Attendance at Deposition.
[R. 095]. The Court set a hearing on Davis' Motion for September 2, 2005 [R. 105], but
prior to the hearing Goldsworthy's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. [R.
108].
Page 5 of 21

The basis for the Motion to Withdraw was that the Goldsworthy had failed to pay
for the attorney services, failed to contact his counsel, and had moved out of the area to
an unknown address. [R. 108: 1-2; 111: 1-2]. Neither of the mailing certificates
accompanying the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel or the Declaration of James W. Jensen
included Goldsworthy's last known addresses. [R. 108: 3; 111: 3]. Indeed, only the
Notice of Entry of Order Permitting Withdrawal of Counsel contained an address for
Goldsworthy, which was his business address. [R. 127: 3].
Because the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel did not include the last known
address of the Goldsworthy, upon entry of the Order permitting Goldsworthy's counsel to
withdraw, Davis' counsel obtained Goldsworthy's last known addresses from his former
counsel. [R. 375: 11 - 12]. Thereafter, pursuant to Rules 5(b)(1) and 74 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, Davis' counsel served a Notice to Appear or Appoint to both
Goldsworthy's home and business addresses. [R. 130:3]. At the continued hearing on
October 14, 2005 on Davis' Motion to Compel, as a result of Goldsworthy's failure to
appear, the Court struck Goldsworthy's pleadings and counterclaim and default judgment
was granted against him. [R. 131; 134:1]. Davis' counsel prepared an order reflecting the
Court's ruling, a copy of which was mailed to Goldsworthy on October 19, 2005 to both
addresses. [R. 134:3].
Because Davis' complaint did not contain a request for damages in a sum certain
amount, Davis requested a hearing on damages [R.136], and on December 22, 2005 the
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Court set a hearing on the issue of damages for February 3, 2006 [R. 139]. The request for
hearing on damages was sent to both of Goldsworthy's addresses [136: 2], and the Court
sent notice of the hearing to Goldsworthy's business and home addresses. [R. 139: 2].
The Notice sent to Goldsworthy's business was returned to the Court as undeliverable.
[R. 142].
On January 20, 2006, the Court received a letter dated January 16, 2006 from
Goldsworthy indicating that he had received notice "from my ex-wife stating there is to
be a hearing on February 3, 2006." [R. 146 (Letter to Court attached hereto as Addendum
"4")]. Goldsworthy claimed to not have been aware of the proceedings in the case "due
to the fact that I no longer live in Utah and now live in Colorado." [R. 146]. Goldsworthy
further requested a continuance of the hearing so that he could get time off work and to
acquire new counsel. [R. 146]. Immediately prior to the damages hearing, Gregory
Hansen filed an appearance of counsel on Goldsworthy's behalf and simultaneously filed
a Motion to Continue the Damages Hearing. [R. 148, 150]. The day before the damages
hearing, Goldsworthy filed a Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default. [R. 156].
The next day, the Court granted a continuance until February 27, 2006 to give the parties
time to brief Goldsworthy's Motion to Set Aside Default. [R. 186].
In his Motion to Set Aside Default, Goldsworthy argued that the default judgment
should be set aside due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect due to the fact that:

Page 7 of21

Defendant was going through a divorce at the time the litigation began, and was
required to shut down his business, and move to Colorado. His only stable address
was that of his business. When he moved, he had no forwarding address. He had
not been able to communicate with his former counsel, Mr. Jensen, since May of
2005, and moved the first week of June, 2005, which was when the Subpoena
Duces Tecum was served on his counsel. Defendant's counsel did not inform him
of the Subpoena or the deposition, and then withdrew in September of 2005
without informing him of the status of the case. [R. 156: 2 (Goldsworthy's Motion
and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default, attached hereto as
Addendum "5", pg. 2)].
Goldsworthy further argued that these events were "so distracting and consuming that he
neglected to pay attention to the lawsuit." [R. 156:2]. Furthermore, Goldsworthy asserted
simply that the Motion to Set Aside should be granted because "Defendant states that the
claims made by the Plaintiff in the case are false." [R. 156:2].
In his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside, Davis argued that
pursuant to Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, p , 104 P.3d 664, Goldsworthy had
failed to show either excusable neglect or that he had a meritorious defense to the action.
[R. 195:2]. Davis argued that Goldsworthy's unsupported statement that Davis' claims
were "false" fell well below the requirement that Davis must "present a clear and specific
proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the
claimant." Hernandez at ^6. [R. 195: 2]. Davis further argued that pursuant to Black's
Title Inc. v. Utah State Ins. DepU 1999 UT App 330, f 10, 991 P. 2d 607, Goldsworthy
had failed to show that he had "used due diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." Id. [R. 195: 2 - 5].
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On the day prior to the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Goldsworthy
submitted a lengthy Reply Memorandum wherein he argued at length that Davis' claims
had no merit because Davis had no standing to raise his claims and that there were
meritorious factual disputes to Davis' claims. [R. 217]. At the hearing the following day,
Goldsworthy presented arguments raised in both his initial Memorandum as well as his
Reply Memorandum, despite the Court's indication that it had not received the Reply
Memorandum and over Davis' objection. [R. 374: 3 -9].
During Davis' counsel's argument, the Court interjected to inquire as to the
method used to serve Goldsworthy with the Notice to Appear of Appoint. [R. 375: 11].
Davis' counsel explained Goldsworthy's addresses were obtained from his prior counsel,
and that the Notice to Appear or Appoint was served via regular first class mail to both
Goldsworthy's last known home and business addresses. [R. 375: 11 - 12]. Davis'
counsel argued that it was Goldsworthy's responsibility to maintain a forwarding address
with the Court and that the rules do not require service via return receipt or personal
service. [R. 375: 12 - 15]. Because the issue was raised sua sponte by the Court and had
not been argued by Goldsworthy, Davis' counsel indicated that he was willing to submit a
legal memorandum on the issue. [R. 375:12]. The Court, however, ruled to set aside the
default judgment, stating simply, "I'm going to grant their motion to set aside the default
judgment" [R. 375:16] without making any further findings. Indeed, as part of its basis
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for awarding attorney fees the Court informed Goldsworthy that he had "been less than
diligent in maintaining contact with your attorneys and this court" [R. 375:16].
Just two days after the hearing, Davis requested that the Court review its
decision to set aside default. [R. 224]. In his Memorandum in Support of Amended
Motion for Reconsideration, Davis argued that pursuant to Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Goldsworthy's prior counsel was required to include the Goldsworthy's
address as part of the motion to withdraw, and that subsection (b) of that Rule provides
simply that Davis should "serve" the notice on the unrepresented party. [R. 237: 3]. Rule
5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that unless otherwise specified in
the Rules, service of documents filed with the Court "shall be made by delivering a copy
or by mailing a copy to the last known address, or if no address is known, by leaving it
with the clerk of the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(l)(emphasis added). [R. 237: 3].
Furthermore, Davis relied on the memorandum decision of Hawley v. Union Pacific
Railroad, 2005 UT App 368 (attached hereto as Addendum "6"), to argue that
Goldsworthy was not entitled to relief from the default judgment because he failed to
fulfill his duty to inform the trial court of changes in his address. [R. 237: 4].
Despite the factual similarities between the actions taken by Goldsworthy and
those taken by the Defendant in Hawley, the trial Court denied Davis' Motion for
Reconsideration and ruled that the Motion did "not present arguments that could not have
been made in connection with the motion." [R. 275]. Davis now seeks this Court's
Page 10 of 21

review of the trial court's ruling to set aside default judgment based upon the arguments
set forth below.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial Court abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment against
Goldsworthy because Davis adequately served Goldsworthy with a notice to appear or
appoint and because Goldsworthy otherwise failed to show that excusable neglect
justified setting aside the default entered against him. Accordingly, Davis seeks an order
from this Court reversing the trial court's decision to set aside default judgment against
Goldsworthy, and remanding the action for a determination of damages.
ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside default judgment because
Goldsworthy was properly served with a notice to appear or appoint, the decision was not
based on adequate findings or on the law, and Goldsworthy otherwise failed to show
excusable neglect. In the preceding below, the trial court granted Goldsworthy's Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment and denied Davis' Motion for Reconsideration based upon
the reasoning that Goldsworthy did not have proper notice to appear or appoint because it
was known at the time of the withdrawal of Goldsworthy's prior counsel that the
addresses on record for Goldsworthy were not current. The Court further denied Davis'
Motion for Reconsideration on the basis that the arguments raised in the motion could
have been made in connection with the motion to set aside default.
Page 11 of 21

In order to obtain relief from a default judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis of excusable neglect, a defendant must show: (i)
that the judgment was entered against him through excusable neglect; (ii) that his motion
to set aside the judgment was timely, and (iii) that he has a meritorious defense to the
action. Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, p , 104 P.3d 664. The basis of this
appeal is that as a matter of law, that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
Goldsworthy's motion to set aside default judgment.
A.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Setting Aside Default Judgment
Based on the Decision that Service of the Notice to Appear or Appoint was not
Adequate,
As a threshold matter, the trial court erred in ruling that default judgment should

be set aside because Goldsworthy was not served a Notice to Appear of Appoint via
registered mail or personal service. Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for the withdrawal of counsel and the sending of a Notice to Appear or Appoint.
In particular Rule 74(a) states in relevant part that the notice of withdrawal shall include
"the address of the attorney's client" and subsection (b) of the same rule provides that
"the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the
unrepresented party." Utah R. Civ. P. 7. Of note, Rule 5(b)(1) specifically provides that
service upon a party of documents filed with the Court, unless otherwise specified by the
Rules, "shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known
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address, or if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court." Utah R. Civ.
P. 5(b)(l)(emphasis added).
A plain reading of Rule 74 in conjunction with Rule 5(b)(1) does not require either
personal service or service via registered mail of a Notice to Appear or Appoint.
Furthermore, the case of Hawley v. Union Pacific Railroad, 2005 UT App 368, directly
addresses the issue of whether the method of service of the notice to appear or appoint a
sufficient is basis for setting aside default judgment. In Hawley, the Plaintiff sought
relief from Summary Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on the
alternative arguments that he had failed to receive a notice to appear or appoint counsel,
and that he was never served with notice of the judgment. In affirming the trial court's
decision to deny Mr. Hawley's motion for relief from the judgment, the Court held that:
Hawley is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because he did not fulfill his
duty to inform the trial court and opposing counsel of any changes in his
address nor did he exercise due diligence in keeping himself informed of
ongoing court proceedings. See Volostnykh v. Duncan, 2001 UT App 26 (per
curiam)(recognizing the parties' duties to inform the court of any address
changes and to "keep themselves apprised of ongoing court proceedings").
Here, Hawley did not inform the trial court or opposing counsel of his new
address. Union Pacific received Mueller's notice of withdrawal but the new
address was not listed in the notice, rather it was found in the mailing
certificate. As a result, Union Pacific attempted to mail Hawley a notice to
appear or appoint counsel to the address provided in the Complaint twice, but
both attempts were unsuccessful. Id.
The facts of this case are directly analogous to those in Hawley. In both instances,
neither Hawley nor Goldsworthy made any attempt to inform the Court or opposing
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counsel of a new address. [R. 165:2]. In the present case, Goldsworthy did not even make
an attempt to keep his counsel informed as to his address. [R. 108: 1-2; 111: 1-2].
Furthermore, Goldsworthy's own letter requesting a continuance of the damages
hearing reveals that he had received notice of the hearing through his ex-wife. [R. 146].
Presumably the second address listed in mailing certificate for the Notice of Hearing is
the address of Goldsworthy's ex-wife and because this notice was not returned to the
Court as undeliverable. [R. 142]. Of note, a copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint,
Default Judgment, and the Request for a Hearing on Damages were also sent to this
address. [R. 130:3; 134:3; 136:2].
As in Hawley, Plaintiffs counsel received a defective notice of withdrawal which
did not correctly identify the last known address of the Defendant. Nevertheless, as
Union Pacific did in Hawley, Davis' counsel attempted to mail Goldsworthy a notice to
appear or appoint counsel to the address where Goldsworthy was served as well as his
business address. Nothing in Hawley, or in Rule 74, suggests that Plaintiffs counsel had
a duty above and beyond serving Goldsworthy with a notice to appear or appoint by
regular first class mail to his last known address. Indeed, Hawley specifically states that
it was Goldsworthy's duty to keep himself current with ongoing proceedings and to
update his address with the Court. Furthermore, Rule 5(b)(1) specifically provides that in
the event that there is no last know address for a party, that service is complete upon
delivery of the document with the clerk of the court. Thus, even in the event that service
Page 14 of 21

of the Notice to Appear or Appoint had been returned as undeliverable to both of
Goldworthy's addresses, service would be complete under Rule 5 by delivery of the
Notice to the clerk of the court.
While these arguments were raised in Davis' Motion for Reconsideration, the trial
court denied the motion on the basis that Davis "did not present arguments that could not
have been made in connection with the motion." However, as noted above, the issue of
proper service of the Notice to Appear or Appoint was first raised by the Court at the
hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. When asked regarding the service
requirement of a Notice to Appear or Appoint, Davis' counsel noted that the issue had not
been raised by Goldsworthy in his memoranda in support of his motion and suggested that
he would, and could, provide a legal brief outlining the authorities that supported Davis'
position that the method of service of the Notice to Appear or Appoint chosen by Davis
was sufficient. While not citing any case law, Plaintiffs counsel further argued that the
requirement that Plaintiff was required to personally serve the Notice to Appear or
Appoint was onerous and not required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
while Davis' counsel did raise the essential arguments set forth in Hawley during oral
argument on the motion to set aside, because the issue was raised sua sponte, Davis'
counsel could not reasonably have been expected to cite the Hawley opinion during the
course of argument. Thus, it was appropriate for Davis to bring this controlling authority
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to the Court's attention through a motion for reconsideration, and given the ruling in
Hawley the trial court should have granted Davis' Motion for Reconsideration.
B.

Default Judgment should not have been Set Aside because it was not
Supported by Any Findings of Fact or on the Law because Goldsworthy
Failed to Show Excusable Neglect to Set Aside the Default Judgment.
Next, this Court should revers the trial court's ruling because the evidence

presented by Goldsworthy does not provide a reasonable basis for the Court's decision to
set aside the default judgment against Goldsworthy. In order to have the default set aside
on the grounds of excusable neglect, Goldsworthy "must show that he has used due
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had
no control. Black's Title Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dept, 1999 UT App 330,1J10 991 P.2d
607. The Utah Supreme Court has found that simply alleging illness alone is not
sufficient to show excusable neglect, but the Defendant must also allege that the illness
incapacitated the Defendant so that he was unable to act. Id. (citing Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 74, 743 (Utah 1953)).
Furthermore, in the matter of Sierra Wholesale Supply, L.L.C. v. Radiant
Technologies, Inc. 2005 UT App 540 (Attached hereto as Addendum "7"), this Court
stated:
Although Defendant avers that its president was out of the office recovering
from back surgery, no affidavit was submitted to the trial court detailing how
this so incapacitated Defendant, a corporation doing business on a national
scale, that it was unable to take steps to protect its rights. See Warren v. Dixon
Ranch Co.,123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 743 (1953)] (finding that excusable
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neglect was not demonstrated by an affidavit that did not "identify the nature
of the illness" or demonstrate how the director and trustee of the defendant
corporation "was so incapacitated that he could not have called an attorney to
have his right and the rights of the corporation protected"). We agree with the
trial court's observation that it seems unlikely that the president of such a
corporation would be "out of the office for back surgery and no one is looking
at this mail." Even if this were the case, however, it does not demonstrate that
Defendant acted with the "due diligence" necessary to show excusable neglect.
See Black's Title, 1999 Ut App 330 at ^ 10 (quotations and citation omitted).
The trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to set aside the default
judgment on these grounds. Id.
In this case, the reasons provided by Goldsworthy to evidence that he used due
diligence were that:
(1) Defendant was going through a divorce at the time the litigation began, and
was required to shut down his business, and move to Colorado. (2) His only
stable address was that of his business. (3) When he moved, he had no
forwarding address. (4) He had not been able to communicate with his former
counsel, Mr. Jensen, since May of 2005, and moved the first week of June,
2005, which was when the Subpoena Duces Tecum was served on his counsel.
(5) Defendant's counsel did not inform him of the Subpoena or the deposition,
and then withdrew in September of 2005 without informing him of the status
of the case. [R. 156: 2 (Goldsworthy's Motion and Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Set Aside Default, attached hereto as Addendum "5", pg. 2)]. See
also [R. 219: 2-3](internal numbers added for clarification purposes).
Furthermore, Goldsworthy's affidavit indicates that (6) "the divorce, move, and
closing of my business consumed my attention, and I neglected the lawsuit because of it"
and that (7) because of these events he was "unable to properly attend to this lawsuit." [R.
210:2].
The trial court did not cite any findings of facts in making its determination to set
aside default judgment. While the Court has broad discretion in granting a motion to set
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aside default judgment, as a threshold matter, a court's ruling must be "based on adequate
findings of fact" and "on the law." May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984).
Indeed, the only statement that may be construed as a finding by the Court does not
support the setting aside of the default judgment. In granting an award of attorney's fees
the Court informed Goldsworthy that he "had been less than diligent in maintaining
contact with your attorneys and this court." [R. 375:16]. The facts presented by
Goldsworthy in his own defense fail on their face to show excusable neglect because he
failed to allege how his divorce, move, or closing of his business so incapacitated him so
that he was unable to act
In particular, Goldsworthy has made no allegations that the divorce, move, and
close of his business were events so "outside his control" that he could not have
maintained contact with his attorney or retained new counsel in order to protect his rights.
In some ways, the present case is more egregious than the neglect evidenced in Sierra and
Black's Title. Specifically, in the present case Goldsworthy actually retained an attorney
to prosecute the matter, who filed a counterclaim on his behalf, [R. 44], and was involved
in setting the time and date for the deposition scheduled for June 13, 2005. [R. 172:2].
All that was required was that Goldsworthy keep in contact with his attorney and respond
to requests through his attorney. But by Goldsworthy own admission, he "neglected" the
lawsuit. [R. 210:2]. In other words, Goldsworthy had ample opportunity to respond,
obtain counsel, appear at properly noticed depositions and other hearings, and simply
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chose not to respond, become involved, protect his rights, or even communicate with his
attorney.
Contrary to Goldsworthy's affidavit testimony that he had no contact with his
attorney since May 2005, at the time of the deposition, Goldsworthy's attorney indicated
that he had "initiated a telephone call and talked to [Goldsworthy's] employment who
said that he was obligated to go to Colorado and didn't give me the details as to why." [R.
166:3]. Furthermore, Goldsworthy's affidavit states simply that "he has not been able to
communicate with his former counsel since May 2005," but provides no further
information regarding whether this failure to communicate was a result of his own neglect
or that of his attorney. [R. 44]. Goldsworthy's prior attorney's affidavit evidences that
Goldsworthy failed to contact his attorney and not the other way around. [R. 108: 1-2;
111; 1-2]. Any inability to obtain information regarding the status of the case and the
eventual withdrawal of prior counsel was not a result of Goldsworthy's prior counsel's
actions, but as a direct result of Goldsworthy's neglect.
As indicated in Hawley, it was Goldsworthy's responsibility to keep himself
apprised of the status of the litigation and to update the Court of his address change. All
that was required was that Goldsworthy update either his counsel or the Court as to his
forwarding address. He failed to do either. This failure is particularly acute given that a
defense was tendered, including a counterclaim, on Goldsworthy's behalf and with his

Page 19 of 21

assistance. To suddenly ignore the litigation evidences lack of due diligence higher than
a simple "loss of interest."
Goldsworthy failed to use due diligence and was not otherwise prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had no control. Nothing asserted was beyond
Goldworthy's control and hence the facts and circumstances of this case do not justify
setting aside default as a result of Goldsworthy's "excusable neglect". Accordingly, the
Court must reverse the trial court's arbitrary and capricious decision setting aside default
judgment.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling setting
aside default judgment, enter default against Goldsworthy, and remand the matter to the
trial court for a hearing on damages.
Respectfully submitted this (W
,

day of April, 2007.

ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN

& M C K A Y , L.L.C.

LO^LmNAEGLE, ^
F o r n e y for Appellant Kenneth Davis
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PLAINTIFF,

5
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) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE/OA

KENNETH DAVIS,

vs.
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) CASE
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030405431
20060924-CA
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) JUDGE JAMES R. TAYLOR

BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing
before the above-named court on February 27, 2006.
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(February 27, 2006)
THE JUDGE:
Be seated.
Mr. Hansen, you've put us at a substantial
inconvenience.
MR. HANSEN:
I know. I apologize for that,
Judge. I'm sorry about that.
THE JUDGE:
Am I correct that your client has come
from Colorado for this hearing?
MR. HANSEN:
That's true. It was in my notes, it
wasn't on my calendar. No excuse.
THE JUDGE:
We set it at 11:00 and we now have 15
minutes.
I don't know if that's realistically time to give
a fair exposition of what's before me.
And I, I just don't
know quite what to do about that.
Mr. Heideman, it's your motion. No, it's Mr., it's
your motion.
Mr. Hansen, it's your motion to set aside the
default judgment.
MR. HANSEN:
My motion to set aside.
THE JUDGE:
What, literally I have to, I have to
recess in 15 minutes.
MR. HANSEN:
Do you have a copy of the reply that
I filed on Friday?
THE JUDGE:
No.
MR. HANSEN:
That contains a lot of what the court
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needs to look at. I can give a brief summary if the cfourt
would like.
Basically it's the same as what we raised
before.
The a,-THE JUDGE:
Well let me, let me be accurate.
What I have is there's a fax in the file. We're not able to
receive faxes so I haven't, haven't looked at it.
MR. HANSEN:
I filed this on Friday at about 3:00
o'clock.
THE JUDGE:
There would be no way.
MR. HANSEN:
Okay.
THE JUDGE:
I haven't had time to look at them
ARGUMENT BY MR. HANSEN
MR. HANSEN:
Basically it is under Rule 60(b)
because of mistake (short inaudible, no mic) or surprise or
neglect excusable neglect.
What happened in this case there is a case that is
very much like it.
If you'd like to take it under
advisement and look at this later I would appreciate it.
There is a case Interstate Excavating versis (inaudible word,
no mic), it's a Utah case where a, the situation is very
similar under Rule 60(b). In that case the attorney for the
defendant had not notified him of the pending situation in
the case, nor did the defendant understood what was going on,
then he actively sought to set aside the judgment.
That is basically what has happened in this case.
COURT PROCEEDINGS

1 The defendant, Goldsworthyfs attorney withdrew. He moved, he
2 did not have a forwarding address, there was a breach, a
3 lack of communication there a n d —
4
THE JUDGE:
Well, I recall the motion to
5 withdraw.
The motion to withdraw was because the attorney
6 alleged that Mr. Goldsworthy was not communicating with him
7 so he-8
MR. HANSEN:
That may b e —
9
THE JUDGE:
-- he alleged that he lost, lost
10 touch with his attorney at that, or with his client at that
11 point-12
MR. HANSEN:
And that's —
13
THE JUDGE:
— that's why the motion was
14 granted.
15
MR. HANSEN:
That's correct.
And what happened
16 is that basically he was forced to shut down his business
17 here, move to Colorado. And he was in the midst of a
18 divorce. Mr. Goldsworthy's affidavit states that he was
19 consumed by the divorce. Unlike I think what the plaintiff's
20 have alleged that a divorce would make you more aware of your
21 surroundings or more aware of your litigation, anyone who has
22 been in a divorce or has witnessed the effects it has on a
23 divorce, a divorce has a person would know that that is
24 pretty consuming to lose your family, to lose your wife, to
25 lose your kids.
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THE JUDGE:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. HANSEN:
And a, it was just an excusable
neglect.
That's, that's basically he just did not take care
of his matters and let the matter go and didn't communicate
with his counsel.
His counsel did not forward the
information along to him about the withdrawal, about the
notice to a, to appoint or a, appear.
And he only got
notice of the judgment, I'm not exactly sure how he got
notice of the default.
But now is actively pursuing to set
aside the default on the merits.
Now the merits are very important h e r e —
THE JUDGE:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. HANSEN:
— is because he has a meritorious
defense for his claims. There was a second thing that has
been raised a, by the plaintiff is that we don't have a
meritorious defense.
Well, if that's true plaintiff has no
standing to bring a majority of his claims in this case.
Number one-THE JUDGE:
Huh-uh (negative).
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Your Honor, I'm going to object.
This is not party of the motion.
MR. HANSEN:
This is part of my reply. And I'm
sorry you didn't have a chance to take a look at it.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Well, I'm sorry. But it should
have been raised at the time of the motion. The only, the
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only matters that are appropriate subject matter to be raised
in the reply are matters that are raised in the motion. If
he failed to raise his proffer at the time of the motion
that's not our problem.
MR. HANSEN:
The reason I did not, Your Honor, is
because I was contacted pretty late in the game. And there
was some, there was a hearing coming up and I had to get
something on file. Did not have time to adequately research
this until later until I got their reply. So then I
replied. And now it's before the court. I would appreciate
it if the court would take a look at it because it is a
meritorious defense.
One of the things that a, the court
must consider are whether there are defenses, whether the
judgment should be set aside or not.
THE JUDGE:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. HANSEN:
Your Honor has stated before that a,
that there, it is more likely or it is the tendency to go on
merits rather than just have a, have a default.
The standing issue briefly.
The chain of title
shows that the plaintiff had the land with his wife Edna.
Upon their divorce they did not want to have it involved in
the divorce so they transferred it to his parents.
His
parents later transferred it back to Edna.
Edna was the
sole owner of the property, nothing was ever raised about
that.
Then she transferred the property to the defendant.
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The plaintiff has no standing to bring a cause of
action because he f s not an heir of Edna, he hasn't shown that
he is an heir, he's not, he doesn't stand to get it under an
intestate statute nor under a Will.
It would be like me
selling my property to you and having the plaintiff come and
say you can't do that.
He just doesn't have any standing in
the property, in the zeal property.
Second of all, the divorce decree specifically
states between he and Edna that the only property, everything
that is in their possession at the time of the divorce is
theirs except for a GMC van which I believe is the truck
they're talking about, and his tools.
Those are the only
things he's raised in this, in this, in this lawsuit that are
claims for his property.
The GMC van is still there at the
property, it's just b€>en moved around behind.
Okay.
The
tools, we don't know where those are, are about.
So that's
really the only issue are there any tools there, who took
them and who is responsible.
If they're still there he can
have them, he can go and get his car. In fact, the plaintiff
has stated or the defemdant has stated that Edna has asked
him several times to remove his property from the place.
So all of the furnishings, the household stuff and everything
in the divorce decree is awarded to Edna, she can do whatever
she wants with it after that. He doesn't have any standing
to bring claims against that stuff.
The only issue really
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is the van and the tools.
So that's the meritorious
defense.
THE JUDGE:
What's the connection of your client
to a, Second Chance, 450 South Main Street in Cedar City or
95 North Drive Light in Cedar City, Utah?
MR. GOLDSWORTHY?:
That, that was my previous
business address and 94 North my ex-wife's home.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
The business address until
when?
MR. GOLDSWORTHY?:
Until May of 2005.
THE JUDGE:
Okay.
All right.
MR. HANSEN: And then on the issue of attorney's
fees otherwise defendant has meritorious factual disputes.
He claims he (short inaudible, no mic) exercise undue
influence, there was no problem there and that a, you know,
he has factual disputes.
As far as the attorney's fees like Your Honor has
stated, the majority of the stuff that they've already done
work can be used in the litigation, a, and so we shouldn't be
required to pay attorney's fees for something they can just
reuse.
Thank you.
ARGUMENT BY MR. HEIDEMAN
MR. HEIDEMAN:
May it please the court.
Your Honor, this is just another attempt by the
defendant in this case to try and benefit from delay. To
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file an inappropriate reply on the basis that he was
contacted late in the game, that's just inappropriate.
It
should be stricken and those comments should be stricken from
the record because we've had no notice of those, we've not
even received a copy OF the reply, and it's not appropriate
to raise those at that point.
But in dealing with the merits of the case there is
simply no way that the defendant concede to have this
removed.
The Hernandez, Black's Title and Sierra case as
well as Warren versus Dixon Ranch make it very clear that
counsel, or that the defendant must be able to show why his
excuse would prevent M m for communicating.
He has to be
able to relate to this court why it is that a divorce would
prevent him from picking up the telephone, from leaving a
forwarding address with the court, or from corresponding with
his counsel.
And we know very well, Your Honor, that Mr. Jensen
attempted to contact the defendant on multiple occasions.
And in fact on June 13th of 2005 we have a record of that
contact before the court. A deposition was noticed, it was
conducted.
At that time Mr. Jensen tried to call his
client's work. His client's work informed him that he was
employed by them still and that he had departed for Colorado
on business.
So a representation to the court that he was
no longer employed there as of May seems to be suspect.
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It's... I simply cannot see where the motion as pled meets
the standard that is required.
The specific language from
the Black opinion I believe is what is relevant here.
In
the Black opinion-THE JUDGE:
Counsel, I want you to back up and
address another problem that Ifm concerned about first.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Certainly, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:
How did you obtain service of your
notice to appear or appoint?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Service of the notice to appear or
appoint counsel?
THE JUDGE:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. HEIDEMAN:
I believe that the court issued
that at the hearing that the defendant failed to appear at
because the defendant had not given a forwarding address to
the court.
THE JUDGE:
Well, how did you serve? Under
Rule 74 how did you obtain service of the (inaudible word,
voice trailed off).
MR. HEIDEMAN:
May I allow Ms. Naegle to speak to
that. She was in charge of that.
MS. NAEGLE: If I may I was actually involved in
that.
The, the initial a, withdrawal of counsel did not
contain an address. And I contacted Mr. Jensen's office and
asked for the addresses and notified them of the problem.
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THE JUDGE:
Uh-huh (affirmative).
MS. NAEGLE: They gave me the two addresses in
regard to-THE JUDGE:
And you simply mailed it?
MS. NAEGLE: Simply mailed it.
THE JUDGE:
And a, is it your position that that's
adequate under the rules?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
I believe it is, Your Honor. It's
his responsibility to maintain a forwarding address with the
court.
It's also h i s —
THE JUDGE:
Can you cite me to a rule that states
that that's all the service that's required?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
I believe that at the point in time
that he has a, an attorney who is given notice of the
hearings and the attorney gives us the forwarding addresses,
I think that, that is his responsibility. I don't have a
rule off on the top of my head but I'm happy to research
and provide a written memorandum to the court on that
position.
THE JUDGE:
Well, I'm troubled by that.
It would
seem that in a circumstance like this where there hasn't been
communication between the attorney and his client, we know
that that's the context, the rule requires that before the
court move forward notice to appoint or appear in person be
given. The obvious intent of that rule is to warn the
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client your attorney is not functioning for you, he's been
allowed out of the case, you're now on your own, you need to
appear by an attorney or by yourself. And simply mailing
that to an address without return receipt requested, without
other proof of service which would be required for a summons
or complaint, or effecting personal service of the notice
which was required under the old rule, a, I'm puzzled as to
how that, that gives the court jurisdiction to go forward.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Your Honor, I believe that this is
a substantially different matter than a service of summons or
a complaint.
This is an individual-THE JUDGE: • Sure, sure it is. But I'm—
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Well, I think that that's why it
addresses the court's concern.
It's, it's repugnant to me
to believe that this individual by simply disappearing can
evade litigation and cost my client money, and that's what
he's attempted to do.
If this court dismisses the default
judgment they will effectively have awarded, or rewarded
that.
THE JUDGE:
Well it may be, counsel.
But it may
be. But the address that you've used is the address who was
provided to you by the attorney who says I haven't got
contact with my client.
How am I to have confidence that
that notice got to Mr. Goldsworthy?
MR. HEIDEMAN::
I think that that's, there's a,
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that that, there's a difference of opinion there.
He says I
haven't had communication with my client as of the date of
his motion to withdraw.
But as of June 13th, Your Honor, he
was making telephone calls to his client's work in my
presence, in front of the presence of a stenographer, and
that stenographer was being informed that he was in fact
working for that company.
You've just heard the defendant
say he was not there after May but that's not true.
We've
got the, the stenographic record that he was on at least
June 13th because they knew where he was at.
And it's, it's... I mean, it seems to be a, a high
burden to place on the plaintiff in this matter to say not
only are you in charge of prosecuting your case but you're
also in charge of making sure that the defendant doesn't run
away from his responsibilities.
THE JUDGE:
Counsel, as of the 24th of August of
2005 James Jensen in his affidavit said,
Numerous correspondence and
documentation was sent to the defendant
and counter-plaintiff and returned moved,
left no address, unable to forward,
return to sender. I have attempted to
send plaintiff has closed his business
with no further contact information.
Then he
moves to withdraw.
That's all 24th of 2005.
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September 20th of 2005, a document dated I think
September 20th, it might be the 25th, must be the 20th, is
when your notice to appear or appoint is filed and
presumably mailed.
Certificate of mailing says it was
mailed that same day by U.S. Mail to the address, which by
Mr. Jensen's address is no longer good.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
I understand, Your Honor.
But at
the same time there is a responsibility on the part of the
defendant.
He has a duty—
THE JUDGE:
Well why go through the motion of
requiring the notice if we don't care if it was served?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Well, Your Honor, we do care if it
was served.
We also care whether or not he's being
attentive to his legal duties.
THE JUDGE:
Okay. I understand.
Anything further further, counsel?
FURTHER ARGUMENT BY MR. HANSEN
MR. HANSEN:
Well they could have... As far as
the service of that notice to appear, I think it all ties
back into whether he ought to be held responsible for a
lapse, for neglect. And, a, they could have reached it,
reached him by service of publication, they could have asked
for certified mailing or some other alternate service.
They
mailed it knowing that, that he wasn't there or at least
questioning—
COURT PROCEEDINGS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE JUDGE:
Well it only gets you so far,
counsel.
ITm going to grant their motion to set aside the
default judgment.
I'm going to grant his, his request for
attorney's fees. I presume I have an affidavit,
Mr. Heideman. Is that correct?
MR. HEIDEMAN: I haven't—
THE JUDGE:
Please submit one, I'll consider the
attorney's fees.
Mr. Goldsworthy, you have been less than diligent
in maintaining contact with your attorneys and this court,
it's going to cost you.
I'll see, I'll receive the affidavit of attorney's
fees and I'll determine the appropriate amount of attorney's
fees to be awarded.
Mr. Hansen, if you'll prepare an appropriate
order. Thank you.
MR. HEIDEMAN:
Do you have time to set a
scheduling conference, Your Honor?
THE JUDGE:
Excuse me?
MR. HEIDEMAN:
We probably don't have time for a
scheduling-THE JUDGE:
We don't have time.
We'll initiate
telephone scheduling conference after I get the order. I
encourage you to do a Rule 2 6 conference
WHEREUPON, the recording was ended.
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£f
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB #8897)
LORELEI NAEGLE (USB #9577)
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C.

2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180
P.O. Box 600
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 812-1000
Fax: (801) 374-1724
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH DAVIS,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff,
vs.

DENNIS GOLDSWORTHY,

Case No. 030405431

Defendant

Judge: James R. Taylor

COMES NOW the Plaintiff by and through his attorneys of record and submits the following
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Reconsideration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On August 29, 2005, Defendant's prior counsel James Jensen filed a Motion for

Permission to Withdraw as Counsel with an accompanying Affidavit setting forth the fact that Mr.
Jensen had been unable to contact Mr. Goldsworthy for some time and that several items of mail had
been returned to him as undeliverable.
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2.

On September 1, 2005, the Court granted Mr. Jensen's Motion for Permission to

Withdraw as Counsel.
3.

Neither the Motion to Withdraw nor Order Granting Leave to Withdraw included the

last known address of the Defendant.
4.

Plaintiffs counsel contacted Mr. Jensen's office to obtain the Defendant's last known

addresses.
5.

On September 20, 2005, Plaintiff filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint which was

served on Defendant to his last known address via regular first class mail.
6.

On February 27, 2006, at a hearing on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside, the Court

granted Defendant's Motion and held that the Court was setting aside the default because the Court
did not believe that the Notice to Appear or Appoint was adequate since it was served via regular
first class mail to Defendant's last known address and not by personal service or registered and/or
certified mail.
ARGUMENT
A motion for reconsideration may be properly heard when it can be properly raised under
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See J.V. Hatch Construction, Inc. v. Kampros, 971
P.2d 8, 11 (Ut App. Ct 1998). Rule 60(b)(1) provides for relief from an order for "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." In this case, the Court reasoned that Defendant did not
have proper notice to appear or appoint because it was known at the time of the withdrawal of
Defendant's counsel that the addresses on record for Defendant were not current. The issue of
proper notice was first raised by the Court at the hearing, and when asked regarding the service
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requirement of a Notice to Appear or Appoint, Plaintiffs counsel suggested that he would and could
provide a legal brief outlining the authorities that supported Plaintiffs counsel's position that the
service made of the Notice to Appear or Appoint was sufficient. Plaintiffs counsel further argued
that the requirement that Plaintiff was required to personally serve the Notice to Appear or Appoint
was onerous and not required under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the withdrawal of counsel and the
sending of a Notice to Appear or Appoint. In particular Rule 74(a) states in relevant part that the
notice of withdrawal shall include "the address of the attorney's client" and subsection (b) of the
same rule provides that "the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on
the unrepresented party." Of note, Rule 5(b)(1) specifically provides that service upon a party of
documents filed with the Court, unless otherwise specified by the Rules, "shall be made by
delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the last known address, or if no address is known, by
leaving it with the clerk of the court."
In Hawlev v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2005 WL 2099788 (Utah App. 2005), the Plaintiff
sought relief from a Summary Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) based on the
alternative arguments that he had failed to receive a notice to appear or appoint counsel and that he
was never served with notice of the judgment. In affirming the trial court's decision to deny Mr.
Hawley's motion for relief from the judgment, the Court held that:
Hawley is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) because he did notfulfdl his duty to inform
the trial court and opposing counsel of any changes in his address nor did he exercise due
diligence in keeping himself informed of ongoing court proceedings. See Volostnykh v.
Duncan, 2001 UT App 26 (per curiam)(recognizing the parties' duties to inform the court of
any address changes and to "keep themselves apprised of ongoing court
proceedings")(emphasis added). Id.
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The facts of this case are directly analogous to those in Hawley. In both cases, neither
Hawley nor the Defendant made any attempt to inform the Court or opposing counsel of his new
address. As in Hawley, Plaintiffs counsel received a defective notice of withdrawal which did not
correctly identify the last known address of the Defendant. Nevertheless, as Union Pacific did in
Hawley, Plaintiffs counsel attempted to mail Defendant a notice to appear or appoint counsel to the
address where Defendant was served as well as his business address, but all attempts were
unsuccessful. Nothing in Hawley or in Rule 74 suggests that Plaintiffs counsel had a duty above
and beyond serving Defendant with a notice to appear or appoint by regular first class mail to his last
known address. Indeed, Hawley specifically states that it is the Defendant's duty to keep himself
current with ongoing proceedings and to update his address with the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff
respectfully requests that this Court reconsider its Order granting Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
and to deny Defendant's motion on the basis that Defendant "did not make reasonably diligent
efforts to learn of the entry of the judgment, and is therefore not entitled to relief." IcL
In the event that this Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff
respectfully requests that the Court certify this matter under Rule 54 for interlocutory appeal.
DATED AND SIGNED this /&

day of March, 2006.

ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY,

JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM 3

FILED
Fourth JuHicin >?*^1 Court
of Utah County. Z&to o\ Utah

^<3/^k

>n &puty

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Kenneth Davis,
Plaintiff

:

Ruling

vs.

:

Date: March 30,2006

Dennis Goldworthy,

:

Case Number: 030405431

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant

This matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. The
motion questions the Court's reasoning and analysis but does not present arguments that could
not have been made in connection with the motion. The motion is denied. Because the
questioned ruling set aside a default judgment to allow complete litigation of the case, this Court
is not able to certify that there is no just reason for delay in bringing the question before the
Court of Appeals. The Defendant may well have asserted a meritorious defense which should be
considered. The Court therefore declines to certify the case for interim appeal under Rule 54,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated this 30*jiay-Q£]

Judge/James Rl
Fourth Judicial
A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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Davis v, Goldworthy 030405431 Ruling 3/30/06
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Justin D. Heideman
Lorelei Naegle
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180
P.O. Box 600
Provo, Utah 84604
Counsel for the Defendant:
Gregory G. Hansen
947 South 500 East, Suite 200
American Fork, Utah 84003
Mailed this_y/
•*2L

day of //ijLU-f-—, 2006, postage pre-paid as noted above.

Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM 4

MLtU

fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

DENNIS GOLDSWORTHY

^

1 |pp|f)(/? ^Deputy

828 Myrtle Ave.
Canon City, CO 81212
719-371-0091

January 16.2006

Dear Judge Taylor,
I am writing this letter in regard to a notice I received from my ex-wife stating there is to
be a hearing on February 35 2006. I was not aware of the ongoing situation with case
number 030405431 due to the fact that I no longer live in Utah and now live in Colorado.
I am asking for a thirty day continuance so that I might acquire counsel and schedule time
off from work so that I can attend the hearing. I would like to express my appreciation in
advance for your consideration in this matter.
Please notify me of any further matters in this case using the above listed address and
telephone number.
Sincerely,

Dennis Goldsworthy

ADDENDUM 5

GREGORY G. HANSEN, Bar No. 10057
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C.
947 South 500 East, Suite 200
American Fork, Utah 84003
Telephone: (801) 763-0155
Facsimile: (801) 763-8379
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT

Kenneth Davis,
Plaintiff,
v.
Dennis Goldsworthy,

CaseNo.030405431
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Defendant Dennis Goldsworthy, by and through counsel, Gregory G.
Hansen, and respectfully moves this court, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to set a side the default entered against him on November 7, 2005. Pursuant to Rule
60(b), a default may be set aside for (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and
. . . (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Further, where any
reasonable excuse is offered by a defaulting party, court's generally tend to favor granting relief
from a default judgment, unless it appears that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the
adverse party. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co, V. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 P.2d 876
(Utah 1975).
In this case, as contained in the Affidavit of Dennis Goldsworthy, filed herewith, there

1

are grounds for setting aside the default for mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect.
Defendant was going through a divorce at the time this litigation began, and was required to shut
down his business, and move the Colorado. His only stable address was that of his business.
When he moved, he had no forwarding address. He had not been able to communicate with his
former counsel, Mr. Jensen, since May of 2005, and moved the first week of June, 2005, which
was when the Subpoena Duces Tecum was served on his counsel. Defendant's counsel did not
inform him of the Subpoena or the deposition, and then withdrew in September of 2005 without
informing him of the status of the case.
Mr. Goldsworthy also states that the difficulties in his life at the time were so distracting
and consuming that he neglected to pay attention to the lawsuit. Further, he did not receive the
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel because it was not mailed to him. However, Defendant is
in a position now where he is able to pursue and properly handle this litigation. Further, in his
affidavit, Defendant states that the claims made by the Plaintiff in this case are false. Moreover,
setting aside the default in this case would not result in substantial injustice to the Plaintiff. He
would only be required to pursue this case on the merits, and will lose nothing if his claims are
meritorious.
Therefore, the court should set aside the default for reasons of mistake, inadvertence, and
excusable neglect, and allow this case to be heard on the merits.
DATED: February / ^ , 2006.
DUVAL HAWS & MOODY, P.C.

(3y~3Jh^~~
GREGORYtl HANSEN
Attorney foiJDefendant
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify than on February g^, , 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE to be
served upon the following by mailing it by first class mail to:
Justin Heideman
Lorelei Naegle
ASCIONE HEIDEMAN & MCKAY LLC
2696 N UNIVERSITY AVE STE 180
PROVO, UT 84604

Secretary
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ADDENDUM 6

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-00O00

L. Earl Hawley,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20040461-CA

v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., a
Delaware corporation,

F I L E D
[September 1, 2005)

Defendant and Appellee.

2 005 UT App 368

Fifth District, Cedar City Department, 000500737
The Honorable J. Philip Eves
Attorneys:

Richard Ranney, St. George, for Appellant
Kent W. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and McHugh.
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
L. Earl Hawley appeals the district court's denial of his
Motion for Relief from Judgment under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(6). We affirm.
Hawley first argues that pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial
Administration 4-506, -an attorney does not need the approval of
the trial court to withdraw as counsel once a motion for summary
judgment has been briefed, argued, and orally decided from the
bench, but before the judge has issued a written final order,
therefore the district court erred when it did not grant Hawley
relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(6).
Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-506 states in part
that "an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only upon
approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court
has not issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of
readiness for trial has been filed." Utah R. Jud. Admin.

4-506(l). 1 In the instant case, a final judgment was not entered
until the trial court judge signed the order granting Union
Pacific Railroad Company's (Union Pacific) Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 20, 2003. Therefore, Hawley's trial attorney,
Mr. Mueller, improperly withdrew as counsel because he was not
entitled to withdraw before August 20, 2003 without seeking the
trial court's approval. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c) ("A judgment
is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes . . .
when the same is signed and filed as herein above provided.");
see, e.g., Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653, 655
n.8 (Utah 1994) ("It is well settled that an unsigned minute
entry does not constitute an entry of judgment, nor is it a final
judgment for purposes of [appeal]," and noting that the
"plaintiffs' motion was premature because [the trial court
judge's] ruling had not been reduced to a written judgment."
(quotations and citations omitted)). 2
Hawley also argues that he is entitled to relief from
judgment under rule 60(b)(6) because Union Pacific did not serve
Hawley with Notice of Judgment as required by rule 58A(d). Rule
58A(d) states that ,f [a] copy of the signed judgment shall be
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided
in Rule 5. The time for filing a notice of appeal is not
affected by the requirement of this provision." Utah R. Civ. P
58A(d). We disagree with Hawley and hold that the trial court
properly denied relief under rule 60(b)(6).
Hawley is not entitled to relief under rule 60 (b) because he
did not fulfill his duty to inform the trial court and opposing
counsel of any changes in his address nor did he exercise due
diligence in keeping himself informed of ongoing court
proceedings. See Volostnykh v. Duncan, 2001 UT App 26 (per
curiam) (recognizing the parties' duties to inform the court of
any address changes and to "keep themselves apprized of ongoing
court proceedings"). Here, Hawley did not inform the trial court
or opposing counsel of his new address. Union Pacific received
x

Rule 4-506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration was
in effect at all relevant times in this case; however, the rule
was repealed effective November 1, 2003 and has been recodified
as Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 74. See Utah R. Civ. P. 74.
2

Hawley argues that he should have received a Notice to
Appear or Appoint Counsel from Union Pacific pursuant to rule 4506 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration because his
attorney withdrew. However, rule 4-506(4) does not apply because
Mueller did not properly withdraw as counsel. Therefore, Union
Pacific was not obligated to serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel on Hawley.

20040461-CA
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Mueller's notice of withdrawal but the new address was not listed
in the notice, rather it was found in the mailing certificate.
As a result, Union Pacific attempted to mail Hawley a notice to
appear or appoint counsel to the address provided in the
Complaint twice, but both attempts were unsuccessful. In
addition, Hawley failed to keep himself current with ongoing
proceedings. Hawley called the court clerk in June, July, and
August to determine if a final order regarding Union Pacific's
Motion for Summary Judgment had been issued. He was advised that
the judgment could be entered at any time, but Hawley did not
call the trial court again for four months--until December.
Hawley did not make reasonably diligent efforts to learn of the
entry of the judgment, and is therefore not entitled to relief.
Therefore, the trial court properly denied Hawley's rule
60(b)(6) motion and, accordingly, we affirm.

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

20040461-CA
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ADDENDUM 7

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00-

Sierra Wholesale Supply,
L.L.C., a Utah limited
liability company,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20041021-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
F I L E D
(December 15, 2005]

v.
Radiant Technologies, Inc., a
Florida corporation doing
business in Utah,

2005 UT App 540

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 030928544
The Honorable Anthony B. Quinn
Attorneys:

Barnard N. Madsen and Trent M. Sutton, Provo, for
Appellant
John A. Snow and Cassie J. Medura, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Radiant Technologies, Inc. appeals the trial
court's denial of its motion, made pursuant to rule 60(b)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1),
to set aside a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff Sierra
Wholesale Supply, L.L.C. We affirm.
"We grant broad discretion to [a] trial court's rule 60(b)
rulings because most are equitable in nature, saturated with
facts, and call upon judges to apply fundamental principles of
fairness that do not easily lend themselves to appellate review.'
Fisher v. Bvbee, 2004 UT 92,^7, 104 P.3d 1198. "It is true that
the law disfavors default judgments . . . . Nonetheless, the
[trial court] has 'considerable discretion under [r]ule 60(b) in
granting or denying a motion to set aside a [default] judgment1
and for this court to interfere, 'abuse of that discretion

must be clearly shown.'" Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins.
Pep' t, 1999 UT App 330,115, 991 P. 2d 607 (fourth alteration in
original) (quoting Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986)).
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by concluding that Defendant failed to demonstrate excusable
neglect in its motion to set aside the default judgment. "To be
relieved from the default, [Defendant] must show that [its]
motion to set aside was timely, that [it] has a meritorious
defense, and that the default occurred for a reason specified in
[r]ule 60(b)."1 Id. at %6. Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant
part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in furtherance of justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect . . . ."
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). "To demonstrate that the default was due
to excusable neglect, '[t]he movant must show that he has used
due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by
circumstances over which he had no control.'" Black's Title,
1999 UT App 330 at ^[10 (alteration in original) (quoting Airkem
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431
(1973) (emphasis omitted)).
The thrust of Defendant's argument is that its neglect in
contesting Plaintiff's complaint was excusable because its
president, John Winning, was out of his office convalescing from
back surgery at the time Plaintiff's requests to enter default
judgment were received and Mr. Winning did not return to the
office until after default judgment had been entered. However,
"'[i]llness alone is not sufficient to make neglect in defending
one's action excusable.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

x

There is also a dispute regarding the timeliness of
Defendant's rule 60(b)(1) motion. However, because we conclude
that Defendant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect, we need
not consider this issue. See Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State
Ins. Dep't, 1999 UT App 330,16, 991 P.2d 607 (requiring the
movant to show that the "motion to set aside was timely, that
[it] has a meritorious defense, and that the default occurred for
a reason specified in rule 60(b)." (emphasis added)).

20041021-CA
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Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 743
(1953)) . "A movant seeking relief may not simply rest on the
assertion that he was ill to excuse his inaction; he must show
that the nature of the illness incapacitated him such that he was
unable to act." Id.
Defendant has made no such showing in this case. Although
Defendant avers that its president was out of the office
recovering from back surgery, no affidavit was submitted to the
trial court detailing how this so incapacitated Defendant, a
corporation doing business on a national scale, that it was
unable to take steps to protect its rights. See Warren, 260 P.2d
741, 743 (finding that excusable neglect was not demonstrated by
an affidavit that did not "identify the nature of the illness" or
demonstrate how the director and trustee of the defendant
corporation "was so incapacitated that he could not have called
an attorney to have his rights and the rights of the corporation
protected."). We agree with the trial court's observation that
it seems unlikely that the president of such a corporation would
be "out of the office for back surgery and no one is looking at
his mail." Even if this were the case, however, it does not
demonstrate that Defendant acted with the "due diligence"
necessary to show excusable neglect. See Black's Title, 1999 UT
App 33 0 at ^[10 (quotations and citation omitted) . The trial
court acted within its discretion in refusing to set aside the
default judgment on these grounds.
Moreover, although Defendant's registered agent, after being
served, mistakenly forwarded Plaintiff's complaint and summons to
the wrong law firm, Plaintiff sent copies of its requests for
default directly to Mr. Winning. Thus, Defendant was on notice
that Plaintiff sought default judgment against it, and that it
needed to act to protect its rights.2
In sum, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying Defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment.

2

Likewise, Defendant's neglect was not made excusable
because the original default judgment mistakenly indicated that
judgment was to be entered in favor of Defendant rather than
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's requests for default judgment, sent to
Mr. Winning prior to the entry of the original default judgment,
correctly indicated that Plaintiff sought default judgment
against Defendant.

20041021-CA
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The facts and circumstances show that default resulted from
Defendant's lack of due diligence rather than excusable neglect.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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